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Reality Is Not a Solid. Poetic Transfigurations 
of Stevens’ Fluid Concept of Reality
A poet ought not to pick nature’s pocket: let him borrow, 
and so borrow as to repay by the very act of borrowing.
S. T. Coleridge
Abstract:  The main aim of this essay is to show that, for Stevens, the concept of reality 
is very fluctuating. The essay begins with addressing the relationship between poetry 
and philosophy. I argue, contra Critchley, that Stevens’ poetic work can elucidate, or at 
least help us to understand better, the ideas of philosophers that are usually considered 
obscure. The main “obscure” philosophical work introduced in and discussed throughout 
the essay is Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism. Both a (shellingian) philosopher 
and a (stevensian) poet search for reality. In order to understand Stevens’ poetry better, 
I distingush several concepts of reality: initial reality (the external world of the common 
sense), imagined reality (a fiction, a product of one’s mind), final reality (the object of a 
philosopher’s and a poet’s search) and total reality (the sum of all realities, Being). These 
determinations are fixed by reason (in the present essay), whereas in Stevens’ poetic works, 
they are made fluid by the imagination. This fluidity leads the concept of reality from its 
initial stage through the imagined stage to its final stage. Throughout this process, imag-
ined reality must be distinguished from both a mere fancy and its products. Final reality is, 
however, nothing transcendent. It is rather a general transpersonal order of reality created 
by poetry/the imagination. The main peculiarity of final reality is that it is a dynamic order. 
It is provisional at each moment. Stevens (and Schelling too) characterizes this order as 
that of a work of art which is a finite object, but has an infinite meaning. Stevens calls this 
order “the central poem” or the “endlessly elaborating poem”. If ultimate reality is a poem 
created by the imagination, one may ask who is the imagining subject. I argue that this 
agent is best to be thought as total reality, that is, as Being. Stevens, however, maintains that 
if there were such an agency, it would be an inhuman agency, “an inhuman meditation”. 
The essay concludes, in a Derridian manner, with the claim that this agency cannot have 
any name; it is the “unnamed creator of an unknown sphere, / Unknown as yet, unknow-
able, / Uncertain certainty” (OP: 127). It is best thought as an X, as an unknown variable. 
Being has no name.
Keywords: Wallace Stevens, Friedrich Schelling, Samuel Coleridge, reality, imagination, 
transcendental idealism, central poem, central mind, Being
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This essay addresses Wallace Stevens’ philosophical project. Stevens’ work  – 
poetic, essayistic, aphoristic, letters, etc.  – contains important philosophical 
insights that he developed primarily in his poetry. However, his prose work 
makes up a significant supplement to, or rather a commentary on, his poetic 
work. It is better to understand his essays this way rather than as independent 
works. Moreover, Stevens attempted to articulate the difference between the 
poetic and philosophical ways of developing philosophical insights. His essay 
“A Collect of Philosophy” is in this respect an indispensable resource. Stevens, 
rather schematically, connected poetry with the imagination and philosophy 
with reason. But he also identified “a poetic style or way of thinking” (OP: 268) in 
various philosophers, such as Plato, Bruno, Nietzsche and Bergson. Philosophy 
is, thus, not based solely on reason, but also, to a greater or lesser extent, on the 
imagination. And, indeed, Stevens wrote: “It is often the case that the concepts 
of philosophy are poetic.” (OP: 267) This approach gives philosophical concepts 
more flexibility. They can be elaborated upon by the imagination as well as by 
reason. In particular, this approach allows Stevens and any commentator to take 
a philosophical concept as something (else), that is, to metamorphose a concept. 
The topic of this essay is the concept of reality and its poetic metamorphoses in 
Stevens’ poetry.
It is no wonder that many philosophical ideas Stevens was preoccupied with 
had been developed by philosophers (and some of whom influenced Stevens – 
directly or indirectly). In a philosophical essay, one can point towards this point of 
contact, and Stevens scholarship has already traced many plausible connections. 
These insights have to originate in a common source. Simon Critchley, in his 
influential philosophical work on Stevens, described this common source as 
follows:  “It is not, therefore, a question of paraphrasing obscure poetic rumi-
nation in clear philosophical prose, but rather of trying to point towards an 
experience of mind, language and things that is best articulated in poetic form.” 
(2005: 4) Critchley, however, presumes that Stevens’ poetry is rather obscure in 
comparison with philosophical prose. This is, of course, a matter of subjective 
attitude. I would like to propose that – given these points of contact – Stevens’ 
poetic work can elucidate, or at least help us to understand better, ideas of 
philosophers that are usually considered obscure.1
 1 The idea that Stevens’ poetry can illuminate philosophers’ ideas (rather than the 
other way around) is advanced by Cook & Read (2009) who take Stevens’ early poem 
“Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird” as a fine example of the “therapeutic” 
reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
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Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism
I shall begin with Schelling’s transcendental idealism as presented in his early 
work System of Transcendental Idealism (1800). Schelling’s work is, to put it 
mildly, obscure, and it is considered by many scholars to be wholly unintelli-
gible.2 Stevens was probably not directly acquainted with this book, but Schelling 
certainly influenced Stevens through Coleridge, whose Biographia Literaria 
draws very heavily upon Schelling’s System. Moreover, in “Imagination as Value” 
Stevens cites a paragraph from Cassirer’s Essay on Man about the metaphys-
ical importance of the imagination in romantic thought. The key passage is 
this: “Schelling declared in his System of Transcendental Idealism that art is the 
consummation of philosophy. In nature, in morality, in history we are still living 
in the propylaeum of philosophical wisdom; in art we enter into the sanctuary 
itself. The true poem is not the work of the individual artist, it is the universe 
itself, the one work of art which is forever perfecting itself.” (NA:  136) In his 
System, Schelling does indeed come to this conclusion, which marks our first 
point of contact between him and Stevens. Before establishing other points of 
contact, let us look at the basic tenets of Schelling’s system and at the reasoning 
which leads Stevens to this conclusion.
The main task Schelling sets himself is to explain the foundation of knowledge, 
which is understood to be the concurrence of the objective (or nature) with the 
subjective (or the self, or intelligence/mind). The self is what can present, nature 
is what can be presented. The self is conscious; nature is non-conscious. It is also 
part of his main task to explain their identity. In order to pursue this task, one 
has to give priority either to nature or to the self. Both possibilities are feasible. 
The former option leads to a philosophy of nature, the latter to a transcendental 
philosophy, which is Schelling’s topic in this book. This attitude has been called 
Schelling’s biperspectivism. The task is now to explain, from the perspective of the 
subjective, how the objective comes to it, that is, how the objective supervenes 
upon the subjective while they coincide. A  transcendental philosophy, thus, 
takes the self as primary and absolute and aims to explain how nature arises 
from it. The primacy of the self/intelligence over nature is for Schelling a presup-
position, a principle of explanation that defines his transcendental approach. It 
is not a metaphysical fact or a conclusion like Kant’s primacy of practical reason. 
 2 Schelling’s System is an early work written under the influence of Fichte’s philosophy. 
It is a transitional work between Schelling’s philosophy of nature and his philosophy 
of identity. It is also his most systematic and polished (or, to put it another way, least 
obscure) work.
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In the System, Schelling also describes the process of emergence of nature (of the 
objective world) from the self ’s basic activity. Schelling’s key insight (shared with 
Fichte and Hegel) is that this activity, which constitutes nature, is also the same 
activity that constitutes the self. If this activity is conscious, it constitutes the self 
and if it is non-conscious, it constitutes nature.
The advantage of the transcendental approach is that the subjective, because of 
its actuality, is an object of direct cognition. The subjective thus becomes objec-
tive in the act of cognition. Transcendental cognition is essentially a knowing 
of knowing. This is what Kant calls transcendental apperception; for Schelling, 
following Fichte, it is an intellectual intuition: “a constant objectivizing-to-itself 
of the subjective” (9). This consideration is important because it already points 
towards Schelling’s final union of nature and the self in art, for a work of art 
is essentially an objectification of the subjective. If the activity that constitutes 
nature is the same activity that constitutes the self, in order to unite them there 
must be an activity that is both conscious and non-conscious. Such an activity 
is, for Schelling, aesthetic activity. The product of this activity, the work of art, 
is the identity of the conscious and the unconscious, which are divided by an 
infinite gap. Hence, Schelling calls a work of art an “unconscious infinity” (225). 
This means that every work of art, though a finite object, has an infinite meaning 
or an infinite multitude of purposes that, for the most part, could not have been 
intended by the artist. In short, in the work of art, the infinite is finitely dis-
played. This is also Schelling’s definition of beauty. These considerations lead 
Schelling to the claim that “the aesthetic intuition simply is the intellectual intu-
ition become objective” (229).
If the infinite opposition (between the conscious and the non-conscious) can 
be resolved in a finite product (of art), there must be a productive capacity of 
the soul that would accomplish this. This most primitive or primordial intu-
ition is called imagination. The imagination is thus the power to resolve an 
infinite opposition in a finite product. This capacity is identical with the (non-
conscious) capacity which produces the objective world/nature. The imagination 
thus produces the objective world in general as well as works of art in partic-
ular (this is the root of Coleridge’s distinction between the primary imagination 
and the secondary imagination). The imagination is superior to reason: “What 
is commonly called theoretical reason is nothing else but imagination in the ser-
vice of freedom.” (176) The infinite opposition concerns not only works of art, 
but every other object and also the objective world as a whole. Hence, Schelling 
can maintain that:  “The objective world is simply the original, as yet uncon-
scious, poetry of the spirit” (12). It is “one absolute work of art” (231). Nature 
is the ultimate work of art; particular works of art are finite instances of this 
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infinite work. This is true for every object; particular works of art are just better 
approximations of the absolute work of art than other objects. Yet this ultimate 
poem is written in a “mysterious” script; it is a “riddle” that could reveal itself 
(232). Schelling concludes the whole System with the suggestion that this abso-
lute work of art is like a new mythology – a collective work of art.
Art is thus superior to philosophy, because philosophy cannot express the 
non-conscious element of the soul and consequently cannot express the unity 
of the conscious and the non-conscious. Philosophy can only postulate the 
non-conscious ground of consciousness, but it cannot describe or represent it. 
Only art can. For philosophy, the absolute is still a riddle. Schelling’s System only 
postulates the ultimate poem; the System, however, is not this poem itself.
Like every philosophical masterpiece, Schelling’s System is a work full of 
tensions and problematic issues. We will focus on those issues that are also rel-
evant for Stevens. The first issue is this:  Schelling’s position seems to be that 
nature/the objective world is (only) a product of an activity of the self. Does, 
then, nature exist independently of the self? Schelling’s idealism is, however, a 
methodological principle of his transcendental philosophy. Schelling thus seems 
not to question the independent reality of the objective world. He furthermore 
maintains that nature is a product of conscious and non-conscious activities and 
their interplay, which is called imagination. Nothing is “actual in the absence 
of imagination” (71). Who is the agent of this imagination? Schelling assumes 
that there is an absolute consciousness beyond empirical consciousness. This 
move also marks Schelling’s break with Fichte, who criticized Spinoza for pos-
tulating such an absolute consciousness without any justification. In order to 
avoid the lapse into Spinozism (or even Neoplatonism), Schelling can insist 
that the adoption of this transcendent agency is, again, only a methodological 
stance. If this were so, there would be a danger of another lapse, this time into 
Cartesian dualism. The ground of the duality of nature and the self and their pre-
established harmony is not transparent for an individual consciousness. It can be 
apprehended only in an aesthetic intuition and expressed in the total work of art.
The second problematic issue is the question of whether Schelling’s system is 
completed, whether it actually returns to itself. Schelling is very optimistic: “A 
system is completed when it is led back to its starting point. But this is precisely 
the case with our own.” (232) But then his System would be identical with the 
ultimate poem. However, this is not the case. The System claims that the absolute 
identity of the self and nature is non-conscious. The System itself is something 
conscious; it can only point out where the absolute identity can be found, namely 
in art, in a new mythology. And even so, doubt remains whether a concrete work 
of art would fully reveal the ultimate identity of (or pre-established harmony 
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between) nature and the self. The worry is that there is no criterion or principle 
that would allow us to determine what the total work of art is. Schelling thus 
seems to have failed in accomplishing his main task: to provide the foundation 
of knowledge.
In what follows, I shall employ two main hypotheses: there are many points of 
contact between Schelling’s System as presented above and Stevens’ poetics, and 
Stevens’ poetic way of developing these ideas can help us to understand better 
the problems of transcendental idealism that Schelling (and Coleridge) were 
facing. In the following analysis of a concept of reality, I will also pay constant at-
tention to Schelling’s System, especially to his concept of nature. The analysis will 
reveal that the relation between these two concepts is highly intricate.
Stevens’ poetry of nature
Let us begin with Schelling’s fundamental distinction between transcendental 
philosophy and philosophy of nature. A  transcendental philosophy begins 
with the subjective and aims to explain how the objective comes to it or can be 
grounded in it. For Stevens, the task of both a philosopher and a poet is to search 
for reality, which he equates with God. Yet their points of departure are opposed 
to each other:
It is the philosopher’s search
For an interior made exterior
And the poet’s search for the same exterior made
Interior (CP: 481)
A poet takes the same route as a natural philosopher. For they search for reality; 
reality is something that cannot be presupposed as given. Reality is, rather, where 
the interior and the exterior come together. Reality in this sense is not the objec-
tive world or even the empirical world. Reality is analogous to Schelling’s knowl-
edge, i.e. the concurrence of the objective and the subjective. In the late poem 
“Not Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself ” (CP:  534), Stevens develops 
this concept of reality/thing itself. If the exterior has to be made interior, then 
the poet is not searching for knowledge/ideas about reality, but for a knowledge 
of reality. The poem concludes “It was like / A new knowledge of reality.” True 
reality and a knowledge of this true reality thus come together.3 Two points now 
need to be clarified: first, what is the notion of reality that Stevens begins with? 
 3 This concept of reality is similar to Schelling’s (and Hegel’s) concept of the 
Absolute: absolute knowledge is knowledge of the absolute.
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(For he maintains that “Reality is the beginning not the end”.) Second, what is 
the nature of the genitive connection “of reality” as opposed to “about reality”? 
Answering these questions will open the way to charting the transformation of 
the concept of reality from initial realityI via imagined realityIM to final realityF, 
where all these modes of reality are encompassed in total realityT.
In order to investigate these transformations of the concept of reality, a few 
methodological remarks are necessary. In “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven”, 
Stevens states that reality is not a solid (CP: 489). Reality, which is arguably the 
most important concept in Stevens’ poetics, is incessantly changing. So too is the 
concept of reality, which is, of course, itself part of reality. One of the tenets of his 
poetic way of dealing with philosophical concepts is that these concepts change 
instantly. The meaning of “reality” (and its cognates, such as “real” and “unreal”) 
can change very rapidly, sometimes within a single line of verse (e.g. in “There 
was so much that was real that was not real at all.” (CP: 425)).
Stevens is explicit on some occasions about what concept of reality he means. 
He sometimes qualifies reality with an adjective: “new reality”, “floridest reality”, 
“major reality”, “total reality”. These cases are the exceptions. On most occasions, 
he does not designate any specific mode of reality. This is by no means a flaw or 
mistake. Quite the contrary, it is typical of Stevens’ poetic way of dealing with 
philosophical ideas, which is based on the imagination rather than reason. In 
order to outline the contrast between the imagination and reason, let us return 
to Schelling. He maintains that the imagination is the most primitive faculty of 
intellectual intuition. This faculty is a continuous activity, “a wavering between 
finitude and infinity” (1800: 176). The faculty of reason consists in fixing a certain 
moment of this activity of the imagination. Reason is imagination suspended or 
stopped. Reason is, in Schelling’s words, the “ideal activity directed immediately 
to self-determining” (1800: 192); it is the “imagination in the service of freedom” 
(1800: 176). Stevens follows Schelling quite closely in this respect:  “we live in 
concepts of the imagination before the reason has established them. If this is 
true, then reason is simply the methodizer of the imagination.” (NA:  154; cf. 
OP: 279)
How can reason fix a concept? This is typically done by means of an adjective 
or an index, as in the present essay. The main methodological tool used in this 
essay is indexing, i.e. fixing a certain meaning of “reality” in order to inject some 
structure into Stevens’ fluid concept of reality. This is something that goes against 
Stevens’ poetic method and ultimately leads to a paradox, an attempt to name 
something that cannot be named – specifically, as will be established over the 
course of this essay, total reality.
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The necessary angel – initial realityI
Reality at the beginning, initial reality  – which I  will mark with an index as 
realityI – is defined by Stevens as “the object seen in its greatest common sense”, 
“a cliché”, “a world plainly plain”, “the corporeal world”, “an external world”, 
“absolute fact”, “Lumpenwelt”. RealityI is the world positively given, the sum of 
all positive facts. It is the world of nature, of its seasons, of the weather. RealityI 
is positive; there is no negation. RealityI in this sense is opposed to something 
unreal, something not real, something not actual. The imagination is the power 
of the mind that produces the unreal, or, rather, the real is transformed into 
something unreal by the power of the imagination. The newly produced unreal is 
thus not a creation out of nothing, but is always partly real. In other words, there 
are degrees of reality and unreality, i.e. the imagination (NA: 7). When Stevens 
speaks about “the pressure of reality” and “the pressure of imagination”, he must 
mean realityI: “By the pressure of reality, I mean the pressure of an external event 
or events on the consciousness to the exclusion of any power of contemplation.” 
(NA: 20) Fiction is another name for a product of the imagination, i.e. for some-
thing unrealI.4 A product of the imagination is also called simply an image. The 
imagination transforms a realI thing into an image of this thing. RealityI is, as 
Stevens puts it, the base (OP: 187); it is the necessary angel.
Another key insight is that realityI is only the base for something else. Products 
of the imagination are initially unrealI; however, they are also in some sense real. 
Imagined things are not nothing. At the very least, an imagined thing, an image, 
exists in the mind. Let us call the reality of imagined things realityIM. Then the 
realIM is a part of the unrealI (though they are not identical with one another).5 As 
we already know, imagined things are transfigurations of realI things. But their 
mode of existence is defined precisely by their non-actuality. As Judith Butler 
aptly puts it in a Hegelian fashion, they “sustain a kind of thereness or presence 
that is the defining or configuring presence of absent things.” (1991: 273)6 The 
absence (unrealityI) of imagined things shapes the presence of things that are 
 4 Charles Altieri writes that “one might argue that [Stevens] understood ‘fiction’ not 
quite as ‘illusion’ but as ‘something made by the mind.’ ” (2013: 3)
 5 This idea can be explained in a dialogue: “This is a picture of a unicorn.” “Yes, but the 
unicorn is not realI. It is an imagined creature: there are no unicorns.” “Horses and 
horns are realI things. So the unicorn is partly realI.” “Furthermore, the picture of the 
unicorn is realI; it is here, in front of our eyes.” “Then, however, the unicorn is realIM 
as an imagined thing.”
 6 Moreover, Butler describes this modality of being as “a kind of structuring absence” 
(ibid.).
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realI. But beyond that, real and imagined things are parts of a greater reality. 
Stevens sometimes calls this kind of being “total reality”:
An object the sum of its complications, seen
And unseen. This is everybody’s world.
Here the total artifice reveals itself
As the total reality. (NA: 87)
The idea of the major reality, the all-encompassing reality, is very explic-
itly expressed in the poem “First Warmth” and its later version “As You Leave 
the Room”:
Now, here, the warmth I had forgotten becomes
Part of the major reality, part of
An appreciation of a reality; (OP: 117)
Here is the later version of these lines:
Now, here, the snow I had forgotten becomes
Part of a major reality, part of
An appreciation of a reality (OP: 117)
This total reality, let us term it realityT, exhibits a peculiar kind of paraconsistent 
logic: “It is and it / Is not and, therefore, is” (CP: 440). This is to be read: it is realI 
and it is unrealI and therefore it is realT. This logic is the key point in “The World 
as Meditation”:  “It was Ulysses and it was not” (CP: 521). And again: Ulysses 
was realT and unrealI.7 Or in “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven”: “Real and 
unreal are two in one: New Haven / Before and after one arrives” (CP: 485) The 
common real, i.e. realI, and the imagined real, i.e. unrealI, are two modes of exis-
tence within one realityT. The total realityT is the conjunction of all modes of 
being; it is Heideggerian Being, the “great Omnium” (OP:  128, 132). RealityT 
includes realityI and realityIM. This total reality is, however, not the reality a poet 
searches for. Why search for something which is already there? The question is, 
rather, whether there is something beyond empirical reality and imagined reality 
within the total reality. This question is equivalent to: is there something unrealI 
that is not realIM, i.e. that is not the product of the imagination?
 7 Butler also comments on this peculiar logic: “Not only was it Ulysses, and it was not, but 
this being and non-being in their uneasy conjunction constitute a different modality 
of being” (279).
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I believe that the distinction between imagination and fancy that Stevens 
adopted from Coleridge comes into play here. Fancy puts things together by 
choice driven by an external purpose, the imagination by the will lying in the 
things themselves. “Fancy […] is an exercise of selection from among objects 
already supplied by association, a selection made for purposes which are not then 
and therein being shaped but have been already fixed.” (NA: 10–11) The imag-
ination is, in contrast, “a principle of the mind’s being, striving to realize itself 
in knowing itself ” (NA: 10). Coleridge’s original characterization of the imag-
ination expresses the same point:  the imagination is “a repetition in the finite 
mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.” (Coleridge 1997: 58) 
Here we are back in Schelling’s transcendental idealism. The root of this char-
acteristic of the imagination lies in Schelling’s intellectual intuition as the power 
of the objectivizing-to-itself of the subjective. Now, products of the imagination 
are realIM, as opposed to products of fancy, which are unrealIM and also unrealI. 
Stevens follows Coleridge when he maintains that “There is always an analogy 
between nature and the imagination, and possibly poetry is merely the strange 
rhetoric of that parallel” (NA: 118). Hence, if the activity that constitutes the self 
is the same as the activity that constitutes nature/reality, then products of the 
imagination are also real as natural things. I am going to argue that this mode 
of reality is the reality that a poet searches for. It is the final reality. I shall index 
it as realityF.
Stevens writes that the “poet has his own meaning for reality” (NA: 25). The 
subject matter of poetry is not external realityI, but realityF. The most significant 
characterizations of realityF are “things as they are” and “the thing itself ”. So, 
“Things imagined (the senses of the guitar) become things as they are.” (L: 360)8 
In my notation, realityF is the same as realityIM. The imagination is “a power […] 
to have […] insights into reality” (NA: 115). RealityF is not a transcendent reality 
like the Kantian thing in itself: “We live in a world plainly plain. Everything is 
as you see it. There is no other world.” (L: 360) Or, as he puts it in a key line 
from “The Man with the Blue Guitar”, “The earth, for us, is flat and bare. / There 
are no shadows.” (CP: 167) There is no transcendent reality beyond realityI, i.e. 
the reality of facts. What, then, is the reality a poet seeks after? We have estab-
lished the following connections: first, products of the imagination, i.e. realityIM, 
are transfigurations of realityI. Second, realityF is a product of the imagination, 
i.e. realityIM. Taken together, these claims amount to the claim that realityF is an 
 8 Stevens expresses this claim very explicitly: “reality = the imagination, and the imag-
ination = reality.” (L: 364)
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imaginative transfiguration of realityI. Stevens expresses this claim in a negative 
manner when he says that “Realism is a corruption of reality.” (OP: 192) RealityI 
is not realityF. Is the necessary angel not, in fact, realityF?
Order of things – final realityF
How, then, to describe this difference between realityI and realityF? The main 
purpose of the imagination is to impose order on realI things. Hence, realityF is a 
re-ordering of realityI. The idea of order is central to Stevens’ poetics. Yet the con-
cept of order is a complex one. Stevens considers three main kinds of order: (1) 
an established social and political order, (2) an individual personal order or order 
created by individual concepts, (3) a general transpersonal order created by poetry 
(or art in general), the final order.9 Order in the first sense is the order of realityI. 
This order is at some times stable, at other times prone to challenge and change. 
Social or political orders often tend to resemble disorder or chaos: “A violent order 
is disorder” (CP: 215). The task of poetry is to find order in this apparent disorder. 
This task is tantamount to the poet’s search for realityF. First, the poet has to clear es-
tablished order (realityI) of images that are not put together by the mind itself. Such 
images are the products of fancy; they are unrealF. The imagination thus sometimes 
works against other products of the imagination (and fancy) which we mistakenly 
believe to be realF; they are violent “Plantagenet abstractions” (OP: 129). In order to 
arrive at realityF, the imagination has to imagine the absence of other products of the 
imagination. This is a theme Stevens was preoccupied with throughout his career. In 
the early poem “Snow Man”, the listener10 beholds or is invited to behold “Nothing 
that is not there and the nothing that is” (CP: 10). In the late poem “The Plain Sense 
of Things”, Stevens states very explicitly that “the absence of the imagination had / 
Itself to be imagined” (CP: 503). In a remarkable passage commenting on his essay 
“The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words”, Stevens writes:
When a poet makes his imagination the imagination of other people, he does so by 
making them see the world through his eyes. Most modern activity is the undoing of 
that very job. The world has been painted; most modern activity is getting rid of the 
paint to get at the world itself. Powerful integrations of the imagination are difficult to 
get away from. (L: 402)
It is now clear that the world that has been painted is the world as we find 
it; it is realityI. The paintings that the poet has to get rid of are products of 
 9 Cf. Cook (2007: 87).
 10 Cf. Ondřej Beran’s remark in this volume (p. 144).
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somebody else’s past imagination. And, indeed, Stevens writes:  “We live in 
mental representations of the past.” (L: 722) Such products of somebody else’s 
imagination are, following Coleridge’s and Stevens’ definition, products of fancy. 
They are, hence, unrealF. In seeking for realityF, these products of fancy have to 
be stripped away or, rather, imagined away. This idea is neatly expressed in the 
“Notes towards the Supreme Fiction”:
    To find the real,
To be stripped of every fiction except one,
The fiction of an absolute (CP: 404)
In these lines, the expression “fiction” is used in two senses:  in its first occur-
rence, fiction means something imagined and unrealF, whereas in the second 
occurrence, fiction is something absolutely realF. The problem is how to tell 
realF fictions apart from unrealF fictions. As Stevens puts it in “An Ordinary 
Evening”: “We do not know what is real and what is not.” (CP: 472) Here, realityF 
must be meant, because we plainly know what is realI, i.e. we know – at least 
some – facts and we possess methods of distinguishing realI (actual) facts from 
unrealI (possible) facts. This is another formulation of the general problem of 
distinguishing between the imagination and fancy.
The idea that the imagination has to strip realityI of the chimeras of the past 
(imagination) is connected to the distinction between the conscious and the sub-
conscious, which brings us to another point of contact with Schelling’s transcen-
dental idealism. Commenting in a letter on his poem “Sombre Figuration”, Stevens 
says in a remarkable passage that: “The sub-conscious is assumed to be our begin-
ning and end” (L: 373). Thus, Stevens goes on, the sub-conscious “is the begin-
ning and end of the conscious” (ibid.). The imagination is usually a faculty that is 
fully conscious. Here, however, rather surprisingly, Stevens links the sub-conscious 
with the imagination and the conscious with reality. The world we live in, realityI, 
is composed of the conscious and the sub-conscious. These two components are 
indistinguishable (“there are realities so closely resembling the things of the imagi-
nation (summer night) that [... they] are indistinguishable” (ibid.)) This, according 
to Stevens, “destroys the order of things”. The imagination – the conscious imag-
ination  – has to strip partly sub-conscious realityI of these “chimeras” (OP:  97; 
L: 374) – in order to restore the order of things, the order of realityF. The poem 
“Sombre Figuration” concludes with the idea of the end of the imagination:
Even imagination has an end,
When the statue is not a thing imagined, a stone
That changed in sleep. (OP: 100)
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The statue stands for reality that is stripped of all the sub-conscious products 
of fancy:  “Farewell, then, to the chimera of the sub-conscious” (L:  374). 
Before moving on, a few remarks on the term “sub-conscious”. It must not 
be confused with the Freudian term “unconscious” (unbewusst). Freud never 
used the term “sub-conscious” (unterbewusst). Stevens might have chosen 
this term in order to block Freudian connotations. When Stevens writes that 
the sub-conscious is also the end, he comes closer to Schelling’s concept of 
non-conscious, which for Schelling is equivalent to nature. What is meant 
here is also the primary imagination, which is sub-conscious. Hence, the 
sub-conscious imagination is part of realityI at the beginning, and the sub-
conscious imagination produces realityF, i.e. the reality at the end (of the poet’s 
search).
When the established orderI is cleared of products of the violent imagina-
tion/fancy, the poet can impose her personal order. What concerns us here, 
then, is the way a poet, while introducing a personal order to realityI, seeks 
for final orderF, harmony, i.e. for realityF. Stevens wrote that “every competent 
poem introduces order” (L: 293) and, with reference to the important poem 
“The Idea of Order at Key West”, that “every man introduces his own order as 
part of a general order” (L: 293). This powerful poem introduces a woman, 
“she”, a muse who sings about the sea. In the course of the poem the muse 
becomes the maker of the world she lives in: “She was the single artificer of 
the world / In which she sang.” (CP: 129) Following this development, the sea 
becomes the muse, the self: “And when she sang, the sea, / Whatever self it 
had, became the self / That was her song, for she was the maker.” (ibid.) In the 
much-debated last stanza, this personal order is transformed into something 
transpersonal:
Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,
The maker’s rage to order words of the sea,
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred,
And of ourselves and of our origins,
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds.
Her order imposed on the sea, which is the sea’s true self, by her song, by her 
words, is part of the order of the enchantment of the world (the fragrant portals), 
which is the spiritual (ghostlier) order of ourselves, of realityF. This order is cre-
ated by words of a poem which become “words of the sea” and “words of the 
fragrant portals” and finally words of ourselves. Interpreters of this poem dis-
agree whether the singing woman introduced in this poem is distinct from 
the lyrical subject (I address this issue in the final section of this essay). Our 
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present concern, by contrast, is how an order imposed by someone’s imagination 
becomes part and parcel of the “rage for order”. This is a restatement of the gen-
eral problem of how, in a concrete situation, the secondary imagination is to be 
distinguished from fancy in order to reach or come back to the primary imagi-
nation. Perhaps the most explicit poetical examination of this problem is in “The 
Man with the Blue Guitar”:
    “But play, you must,
A tune beyond us, yet ourselves,
A tune upon the blue guitar
Of things exactly as they are.” (CP: 165)
The man with the blue guitar is asked to play a tune that is beyond us, yet our-
selves. The blue guitar stands for or alludes to the imagination. The man – the 
poet, an imaginative man – plays/imagines his own tune, which turns out to be 
a transpersonal tune (“ourselves”) and, eventually, a tune transcending anyone’s 
(secondary) imagination (a “tune beyond us”): a tune of realityF, i.e. of things as 
they are. The tune is produced by the imagination, and, therefore, it imposes 
a certain order – initially the poet’s personal order, then a transpersonal order 
and, in the end, a final order of realityF. Here we have again the genitive rela-
tion “of things as they are” – “of realityF” – which will be the subject of the next 
section. I want to make only a brief remark here: the genitive relation indicates 
that the tune becomes part of realityF and not merely about it. Then, however, 
realityF is produced/created by this very act of the imagination (that is, the act 
of playing the tune). RealityF is not created completely anew by this act; rather, 
it is reordered.
We have arrived at an important, albeit paradoxical, feature of the final order 
of realityF: it is not a static order, but a changing one. Stevens wrote that: “The 
only possible order of life is one in which all order is incessantly changing” 
(L: 291–92). In “The Man with the Blue Guitar”, we read: “Things as they are / 
Are changed upon the blue guitar.” (CP: 165) Stevens devoted many poems to the 
idea of change. To name just a few: “Of Modern Poetry”, with its constant finding 
of new stages, “Human Arrangement”, with “The centre of transformations that 
/ Transform for transformation’s self ” (CP: 363), or the section “It Must Change” 
from “Notes towards a Supreme Fiction”, with “a universe of inconstancy” 
(CP: 389). This change is paradoxical, because any change has to be conceived 
against some static background. Yet there is no such background if things as they 
are are the ultimate realityF. Stevens was aware of this paradoxical situation. In 
“As You Leave the Room”, he writes: “And yet nothing has been changed except 
what is / Unreal, as if nothing had been changed at all.” (OP:  118) The most 
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explicit expression of the paradoxical nature of changing realityF is expressed in 
stanza VI of “The Man with the Blue Guitar”:11
A tune beyond us as we are,
Yet nothing changed by the blue guitar;
Ourselves in the tune as if in space,
Yet nothing changed, except the place
Of things as they are and only the place
As you play them, on the blue guitar,
Placed, so, beyond the compass of change,
Perceived in a final atmosphere;
For a moment final, in the way
The thinking of art seems final when
The thinking of god is smoky dew.
The tune is space. The blue guitar
Becomes the place of things as they are,
A composing of senses of the guitar. (CP: 167–68)
The guitar/the imagination changes things as they are. What has changed, how-
ever, is the “place”12, which is, in the last couplet, identified as the blue guitar/
the imagination. The imagination itself has changed. Or the man with the blue 
guitar/the poet imagines that his (faculty of) imagination has changed itself. If 
it is only the imagination that has changed, then things as they are are the static 
background; they are “beyond the compass of change”. The paradox is resolved 
 11 These two poems, “The Man with the Blue Guitar” (1937) and “As You Leave the Room” 
(1947–1955?), come from different stages of Stevens’ poetic career. The ideas expressed 
are, however, arguably very similar.
 12 A rethinking or, rather, a metamorphosing of the notion of place (and space and time) 
is a frequent motif in Stevens, e.g. in “Description without Place” with the opening line 
“It is possible that to seem—it is to be” (CP: 339). In “A Collect of Philosophy”, Stevens 
follows Whitehead in abandoning the notion of simple location (OP: 273). Location 
is not the primary way in which things are in space and time. Rather, “everything is 
everywhere at all times” (ibid.), that is, everything is connected to every other thing, 
“every location involves an aspect of itself in every other location”. These connections 
produce “in the imagination a universal iridescence” (ibid.). These connections are 
realF and unrealI, where our ordinary spatiotemporal connections are realI and unrealF. 
Hence, realityF is produced in the imagination.
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for a moment. Things as they are are “perceived in a final atmosphere”. This 
finality is, however, only provisional. A final order of things as they are is only 
for a present moment final. An order imposed by the imagination on things as 
they are is final and complete in the way that works of art are complete. On the 
one hand, works of art are considered to be complete, but on the other hand they 
can always be reinterpreted or transfigured (by contrast with the rigid systems of 
religions). We have again arrived at a point of contact with Schelling’s transcen-
dental idealism. For Schelling, a work of art, although harmonious in its finite 
shape, has an infinite meaning. Stevens’ emphasis on the provisional character 
of this order is, however, an implicit critique of Schelling’s optimism about the 
completeness of his system. RealityF, things as they are, is never completed; it 
is always changing or, rather, elaborating. For Stevens, then, realityF is (like) an 
always-changing work of art, or (more specifically) like a poem. This hypothesis 
will be addressed in the final part of this paper.
Let us consider again for a moment Stevens’ idea that the blue guitar/the faculty 
of the imagination itself is changing. This means that the man with the blue guitar, 
i.e. the poet, the imagining subject, is changing. “The blue guitar / And I are one.” 
(CP: 171) The subject is thus not a static underlying thing – a subiectum, ὑποκείμενον – 
which is the condition of all change. The subject is, rather, something closer to 
Hegel’s self-developing subject. The existence or even the postulating of such a 
subject, however, undermines all we said about the ultimate character of realityF. 
If realityF is produced by the imagination, then there must be an imagining sub-
ject behind it all that constitutes the (transcendental) condition of the existence of 
realityF. And, indeed, Stevens considers this idea of a transpersonal mind imag-
ining realityF. He gives it a variety of names, e.g. “central mind” (CP: 298), “creator”, 
“master of all force” (CP: 97), “master of the mind” (CP: 148), “giant” (CP: 442), 
“Ruler of Reality” (CP: 485). Stevens playfully employs this idea, sometimes as a 
hypothesis, as part of a dialectical argument, at other times in a mocking tone.
We have arrived at three main ideas that are central to Stevens’ idealistic 
poetics:  (1) the genitive connection “of ” realityF/things as they are, (2)  taking 
realityF as a total poem (or realityF being this poem), and finally (3) the central 
mind or the agent of the transpersonal imagination producing realityF. I will ad-
dress these complexes in turn.
The grammar of “as” and “of ”
The aim of this section is to establish connections among several complex motifs 
of Stevens’ poetics. I have already indicated that the genitive relation “of ” refers 
to something, or a product of the imagination in particular, being a part of a 
Poetic Transfigurations of Stevens’ Concept of Reality 77
whole, of realityF, and not merely about it. Since products of the imagination are, 
as we have already established, images, we can conceive the genitive relation as 
the relation between an image and that which is depicted. An image is not merely 
about its object, i.e. about that which is depicted; rather, an image resembles its 
object. The imagination transforms a thing into its image. Stevens explores the 
imagination’s activity of creating resemblances using the preposition “as”, e.g. in 
“sun as horn” (CP: 269), “Young men as vegetables” (CP: 278), “this shadow as 
/ A human thing” (CP: 300), “the whole world as metaphor” (CP: 332), “The 
World as Meditation” (CP: 520). Initially, resemblance is, quite naturally, a rela-
tion between two (realI) things (NA: 71). Such resemblances can be found in or 
read from realityI. Stevens also, however, considers resemblances between realI 
things and imagined (i.e. realIM) things and finally between two imagined things 
or concepts (NA: 72). And of course, such resemblances are created by the imag-
ination. E. Alexander (2015: 68) points out that Stevens’ use of “of ” functions as 
a kind of counterpoint to “as”. “Of ” marks the emergence of a certain perspec-
tive, or a certain aspect, whereas “as” picks out corresponding qualities emerging 
under this perspective. Let us investigate these two prepositions in more detail.
Charles Altieri has already provided a thoroughgoing analysis of the grammar 
of “as” in Stevens. He connects the grammar of “as” with “processes of analogical 
thinking” and adds:
Beginning with “The Man with the Blue Guitar,” Stevens manifests a substantial and 
growing interest in how the “interaction” or “inter-relation between things” becomes 
a crucial “source of potency” in the lyric […]. This sense of multivalued equivalences 
leads Stevens to what the grammar of “as” can offer. […] I can characterize that mode 
of attention as an “aspectual thinking” that dominates the poetry of Auroras of Autumn. 
(2013: 41)
The peculiarity of “as” is that “unlike the copulative verb, it states equivalences 
that mark the activity of the subject in the formulation of the object” (42). 
“As” thus highlights the activity of the imagination that creates various aspects 
or perspectives that define the object. Altieri’s analysis draws substantially on 
Wittgenstein’s considerations about aspect seeing. I  argue elsewhere (2015, 
 chapter 17) that within Wittgenstein’s thinking “as” internally relates two concepts 
(or imagined, i.e. realIM things). For Wittgenstein, however, reflexive cases of 
internal relations make no sense. “It would have made as little sense for me to say 
‘Now I am seeing it as …’ as to say at the sight of a knife and fork ‘Now I am seeing 
this as a knife and fork.’ ” (Wittgenstein 2009: PPF §122/p. 205e)13 In what follows 
 13 Cf. Mácha (2015: 183) for more examples.
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I would like to show that such reflexive cases of “as” are crucial for Stevens’ poetry, 
most notably in the phrase “things as they are”. There are variations of this phrase, 
such as “Things as they were, things as they are, / Things as they will be by and 
by . . .” (CP: 178) and “And as I am, I speak and move / And things are as I think 
they are” (CP: 180). On many occasions, the subject, the “I”, is – one would say in 
a Fichtean manner – reflexively related to itself. Here is a list of some such cases:
It is what it is as I am what I am (CP: 146)
You as you are? You are yourself. (CP: 183)
There as he is / He is. (CP: 235)
As I am, I am (CP: 395)
I have not but I am and as I am, I am. (CP: 405)
Other instances of this reflexive relation involve real or imaginary things or persons:
The departing soldier is as he is (CP: 306)
the grandson sees it as it is (CP: 462)
The gay tournamonde as of a single world / In which he is and as and is are one. 
(CP: 476)
He has thought it out, he thinks it out, / As he has been and is (CP: 485)
Each person completely touches us / With what he is and as he is (CP: 505)
And finally, this reflexive relation can involve processes or even abstract things:
One’s tootings at the weddings of the soul / Occur as they occur. (CP: 222)
The world lives as you live, / Speaks as you speak (CP: 268)
The words they spoke were voices that she heard. / She looked at them and saw them 
as they were (CP: 402)
wax, sonorous, fame as it is (CP: 403)
To see their lustre truly as it is (CP: 432)
He speaks / By sight and insight as they are. (CP: 473)
The need to be actual and as it is. (CP: 530)
The aim of these long lists is to show that reflexive cases of the relation that “as” 
expresses are ubiquitous in Stevens’ poems. How can a thing resemble itself? How 
can a thing be an aspect of itself? Wittgenstein is right in proclaiming that such 
expressions make little sense in everyday language. I think, however, that the grammar 
of “as” is different within Stevens’ poetics, and we can make sense of reflexive “as” re-
lations. The main idea is this: if, as Altieri maintains, “as” marks the activity of the 
subject’s imagination in creating the object, the reflexive use of “as” would express the 
product of this activity, that is the thing as it is, the thing itself. As we already know, 
“the thing as it is” or “things as they are” express realF things, i.e. realityF.
The imagination produces images of things. If the product of the imagination 
is the thing itself, then the realF thing (or the thing as it is) becomes its image. 
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That is, the distinction between an image and that which is depicted (or the dis-
tinction between a thing and its image) vanishes or, rather, is sublated. “As and is 
are one.” (CP: 476) This is, I think, the meaning of the much-discussed line “the 
intricate evasions of as” (CP: 486). In realityF, all images of things, all As as Bs, are 
evaded – apart from the reflexive “as”, all things are as they are. The reflexive “as” 
in “things as they are” is irreducible and hence an intricate marking of the fact 
that realityF is the product of the imagination.14 The world, realityF, is an image, 
“the chief image”:  “The world is no longer an extraneous object, full of other 
extraneous objects, but an image. In the last analysis, it is with this image of the 
world that we are vitally concerned.” (NA: 151)15 In Stevens’ poetry, this idea is 
usually entertained as a hypothesis, e.g. in the opening section of “Description 
without Place”: “It is possible that to seem—it is to be, / As the sun is something 
seeming and it is.” (CP: 339) Stevens adds that the sun is an example here to 
make the hypothesis possible. The sun is also the source of all life and, in the end, 
the symbol of realityF (cf. Cook 2007: 113). Similarly, the opening section of “The 
Sail of Ulysses” sets out the hypothesis of the identity of knowledge and being: “If 
knowledge and the thing known are one / […] Then knowledge is the only life, 
/ The only sun of the only day” (OP: 126). Ulysses, the seeker, the poet, seeks for 
realityF, that is, for knowledge of realityF, rather than for knowledge about reality. 
This brings us to the final topic of this section: the genitive relation “of ”.
My task of explaining the genitive relation “of ” is made easier by Jennifer 
Bates’ (1999) brilliant study. She provides a detailed analysis of the late poem “Of 
Mere Being” based on Hegel’s account of metaphor. The genitive “of ” is related to 
the Greek “genesis”, γένεσις, meaning origin, source, beginning, production, cre-
ation. In “Of Mere Being”, the genitive makes the experiencing subject of Being, 
and Being of the subject. Subject originates in object and object originates in 
subject. Now, in metaphor, “we are drawn into the image […], into the possi-
bility of connection; we are drawn into the possibility of connection as an engen-
dering relation. This engendering is […] the generative ‘of ’ of the symbolic 
 14 In the “Notes”, Stevens writes: “To find the real, / To be stripped of every fiction except 
one, / The fiction of an absolute” (CP: 404). RealityF is stripped of every fiction, every 
“as”, except the fiction of itself, except the reflexive “as”. This is a supreme fiction. Cf. 
however K.-F. Kiesow’s essay in the present volume, which argues that the central 
poem is an ontological notion whereas supreme fiction is concerned primarily with 
the social role of faith. From my point of view, a supreme fiction is a supreme finite 
approximation of the central poem, which is infinite.
 15 In the essay “A Collect of Philosophy”, we read: “The material world […] has become 
immaterial. It has become an image in the mind.” (OP: 272)
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imagination.” (ibid.: 161) It is crucial for such an image that it is marked by a 
certain imperfection in contrast to the thing depicted. This imperfection lies also 
in the nature of the genitive (ibid.: 155), or with Stevens: “The imperfect is our 
paradise.” (CP: 194) The poem “Of Mere Being” uncovers the flux of engendering 
of imperfect images and their pointing “to their end, to how they are incomplete” 
(Bates 1999: 163).
Equipped with this analysis, we can say that the poem “Of Mere Being” itself 
is a part of this flux of Being, of realityT. It is “the flux / Between the thing as idea 
and / The idea as thing.” (CP: 295)16 This poem itself is a part of this flux and 
because it is only a part of the flux, it is, in this sense, imperfect. This poem, and 
indeed any poem, is a part of the final order (which is, in a sense, never final). 
This is expressed in “An Ordinary Evening”:
The poem is the cry of its occasion,
Part of the res itself and not about it.
The poet speaks the poem as it is,
Not as it was: part of the reverberation
Of a windy night as it is, (CP: 473)
The poem (meaning any poem) is of the res, i.e. of the thing itself, i.e. of realityF. 
RealityF is the order of being, of realityT, that consists of the flux of the imagina-
tion that engenders imperfect or incomplete images17 that, as the poet searches 
for this order, for realityF, return back to their origin. We have now arrived at a 
point that brings us back to Schelling’s ultimate poem. For Stevens too, realityF 
is an ultimate poem. I shall focus on this nature of realityF as a poem in the next 
section.
 16 “Of Mere Being” is not the only poem that directly addresses Being as the realm beyond 
thought, beyond the mind, beyond knowledge. In “Extracts from Addresses to the 
Academy of Fine Ideas”, we read:
Where is that summer warm enough to walk
Among the lascivious poisons, clean of them,
And in what covert may we, naked, be
Beyond the knowledge of nakedness, as part
Of reality, beyond the knowledge of what
Is real, part of a land beyond the mind? (CP: 252)
 17 Imperfect images are “lesser things”: “Too much as they are to be changed by metaphor, 
/ Too actual, things that in being real / Make any imaginings of them lesser things.” 
(CP: 430)
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Central poem – final realityF
In this section, I argue that the order that makes up realityF is that of a poem 
which Stevens variously labels the “central poem”, the “ultimate poem”, “pure 
poetry” or the “poem of poems”. Milton Bates adds to this list the following 
terms: “a ‘primitive,’ or archetype; an ‘orb,’ or planet; an ‘essential poem’; a ‘huge, 
high harmony’; a ‘miraculous multiplex of lesser poems’; a ‘vis’; a ‘principle’; a 
‘nature’; a ‘patron of origins’; and a ‘skeleton of the ether’ ” (2007: 58–59).
Stevens seems to express the idea that realityF is already poetry in “The Man with 
the Blue Guitar”. In canto XXII we read:
Poetry is the subject of the poem,
From this the poem issues and
To this returns. Between the two,
Between issue and return, there is
An absence in reality,
Things as they are. (CP: 176)
Stevens made the following comment on this canto: “The purpose of writing poetry 
is to attain pure poetry.” (L: 363) This is a restatement of the basic task of the poet: the 
search for pure poetry is the search for realityF. Given the analysis of the genitive 
“of” above, we can say that the poem is of (pure) poetry. Poetry is the ground of the 
poem. In the movement from poetry, there is an absence of things as they are, i.e. 
realityF. This means there is something unrealF, like products of fancy. This is the 
poem’s imperfection. There is, however, realityF at the beginning and at the end.
Stevens examined the notion of the central poem in his essays from the 
1940s and in several poems, most notably in “A Primitive Like an Orb” and “An 
Ordinary Evening”. Let us turn to the former. The first stanza begins with the 
line: “The essential poem at the centre of things” (CP: 440) This poem is a “diffi-
cult apperception” for us, for “dear sirs” or for the poet. I take this to mean that it 
is difficult for the subject to realize that, or recognize whether, they, the subject, 
are imagining the essential poem. Apperception is another name for the intellec-
tual intuition that lies at the foundations of Schelling’s and Coleridge’s systems. 
When Stevens problematizes this notion with the adjective “difficult”, he is under-
taking an implicit critique of their approaches. The second stanza develops this 
idea:  “We do not prove the existence of the poem. / It is something seen and 
known in lesser poems.” Lesser poems are the imperfect poems from the pre-
vious paragraph; lesser poems are of pure poetry, of the essential poem, of realityF. 
Lesser poems issue from the central poem and they return to it. This flux, this 
cycle of the imagination, is symbolized by an orb (like an orbital cycle of a planet). 
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The essential poem is seen and known in lesser poems. If the essential poem is 
nothing but transcendental, it does not exist separately from the lesser poems.18 
In other words, the essential poem is a composition of the lesser poems, as we 
read in stanza VII: “The central poem is the poem of the whole, / The poem of the 
composition of the whole” (CP: 442). The central poem is the composition, the 
final order of realityF. Stevens opens stanza III with “One poem proves another 
and the whole / For the clairvoyant men that need no proof ”, and continues:
The lover, the believer and the poet.
Their words are chosen out of their desire,
The joy of language, when it is themselves.
With these they celebrate the central poem,
The fulfillment of fulfillments, in opulent,
Last terms, the largest, bulging still with more, (CP: 441)
The central/essential poem is celebrated in lesser poems and, more importantly, 
it is “the fulfillment of fulfillments”. This is, again, a reflexive genitive construction 
like the reflexive “as” in “as it is” or “as they are”. The central poem does not bring 
some fulfilment that would be acceptable for us, like the “poem of the mind in the 
act of finding / What will suffice” (CP: 239). The central poem is the fulfilment of 
fulfilments, the essence of all fulfilments, the paradigmatic fulfilment. The fifth stanza 
concludes with this long sentence: “It is / As if the central poem became the world, / 
And the world the central poem, each one the mate / Of the other” (CP: 441). Some 
commentators (e.g. Leuschner 2010: 73) have taken these lines as Stevens’ distancing 
himself from the identity of the central poem and the world; it is only “as if”. The 
expression “world” is ambiguous here. The central poem is as if realityT, as if Being, 
which also includes something unrealF. The central poem is, however, (identical 
with) the true realityF.19 Stanza VIII brings additional characterizations of the central 
 18 See Steinman (1977: 13–4) for an endorsement and discussion of this claim. Cf. also 
Stevens’ claim from his “Adagia”: “Every poem is a poem within a poem: the poem of 
the idea within the poem of the words.” (OP: 199) Every lesser poem is a poem within 
the poem of the idea, within the essential poem.
 19 Failing to draw this distinction, Kronick, in my view quite wrongly, maintains: “The essen-
tial poem, consequently, is a rumor heard in lesser poems; it is a poem of / The ‘whole,’ 
a poem about and never the whole itself.” (1983: 93) The essential poem is not about 
the whole, it is of the whole, of Being, of realityT. Similarly, Benardete (1996: 181) 
claims that “this essential poem may even prove to encode metaphysical reality itself.” 
Which reality? The essential poem is proven by and in lesser poems. It does not encode 
anything else, it is not about anything else. Closer to my view, Pietrzak (2011: 224) 
claims, following Bloom, that the central poem “evokes Heidegger’s renditions of the 
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poem: a “vis”, a “principle”, the “meditation of a principle”, an “inherent order active to 
be itself”, a “nature to its natives”, a “repose, utmost repose”. The last line of the stanza 
breaks with these familiar descriptions by introducing a giant, a mythological figure. 
The central poem is maybe embodied in a giant, maybe transformed into a giant (cf. 
Steinman 1977: 13), or maybe the giant is the agent of the meditation of the central 
poem. At any rate, the harmonious picture of the previous stanzas is disturbed by 
the image of a giant. If the central poem is the true realityF, it cannot be grounded 
in something else, in a giant. Introducing a giant is a “difficult apperception” from 
the beginning of the poem. Such an agent cannot be named: “A definition with an 
illustration, not / Too exactly labelled” (CP: 443). We see “his fated eccentricity” as 
opposed to the centre of the poem. The giant is, in the end, “the giant of nothingness”. 
These problems concern, however, the giant, and not the central poem as several 
commentators (e.g. Kronick (1983) and Leuschner (2010)) have maintained. I will 
address the problem of the agent of the central poem in the next section.
In 1949, one year after publishing “A Primitive Like an Orb”, Stevens further 
developed the motif of the central poem in “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven”. 
The opposition between the central poem and the agent of the imagination – which 
is explored in “A Primitive Like an Orb” – is addressed in terms of a meditation. 
This long poem opens with “the never-ending meditation” or “the perpetual med-
itation”, which is the meditation of the central poem (“a larger poem”) and “[p] art 
of the question that is a giant himself ”, i.e. the agent of this meditation (CP: 465–6). 
The central poem is, furthermore, termed the “poem of pure reality” in canto IX:
        We seek
The poem of pure reality, untouched
By trope or deviation, straight to the word,
Straight to the transfixing object, to the object
At the exactest point at which it is itself,
Transfixing by being purely what it is, (CP: 471)
The poem of pure reality is our ultimate aim, the ultimate aim of the poetic sub-
ject in the plural, which, as we already know, is realityF. The poem of pure reality 
is at the intersection between the word as it is and the object itself. The word is 
elusive concept of Being” and furthermore equates the central poem “with the supreme 
fiction of a First Idea” (225). I claim, in contrast, that the central poem is a certain 
order of Being, not Being itself. The central poem is realityF, not realityT. However, in 
the section “Central mind” below I vindicate the idea that realityT/Being is the agent 
imagining the central mind.
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untouched by a trope, or more specifically, by a metaphor which sees a word as 
something else and thereby deviates from the word into something else. A meta-
phor is a way of reaching the central poem, not part of the central poem itself. The 
object is the most exact point of its being. The poem of pure reality is thus located 
in the centre of reality between word and object, between language and the world, 
which means the poem is realityF. Any particular poem, any “lesser poem”, “is the 
cry of its occasion, / Part of the res itself and not about it.” (CP: 473) The develop-
ment of this motif culminates in canto XXVIII with these lines of utmost intricacy:
This endlessly elaborating poem
Displays the theory of poetry,
As the life of poetry. A more severe,
More harassing master would extemporize
Subtler, more urgent proof that the theory
Of poetry is the theory of life,
As it is, in the intricate evasions of as,
In things seen and unseen, created from nothingness,
The heavens, the hells, the worlds, the longed-for lands. (CP: 486)
This canto opens with a conditional clause: “If it should be true that reality exists 
/ In the mind […], it follows that / Real and unreal are two in one” (CP: 485). In 
this elaborating poem, the theory of poetry is displayed as the life of poetry. Yet 
there is a subtler hypothesis (that does not really need any proof due to the “diffi-
cult apperception”): the theory of poetry is the theory of life. The “as” is changed 
into “is”. This is the intricate evasion of “as”. This reality that exists in the mind is 
the life of poetry, pure poetry untouched by trope, by metaphor, by “as”. And this 
“reality changes from substance to sub[t] lety” (NA: 174), that is, realityF is not a 
metaphysical substance, the ground of all that there is; it is not Being, but rather 
the subtlest order. RealityF is also life; it is the endlessly elaborating poem, the 
poem of pure realityF, the central poem. Stevens expressed this ultimate point in 
many shorter aphorisms like: “The mind renews the world in a verse” (OP: 129), 
or “the world arranges itself in a poem” (OP: 191). For the theory of poetry is 
the theory of life, this arrangement into realityF, i.e. into a poem, into the central 
poem, is also marked by the transfiguration of the notion of reality, which is the 
main topic of the present essay. RealityI, taken as appearance which is opposed 
to transcendent reality (Spinoza’s substance or the Kantian thing in itself), is 
transformed into realityF, which is not a substance or something transcendent, 
but rather a subtle poetic order. In “Three Academic Pieces”, Stevens renders 
this transformation into the theory of poetry as almost a deductive inference: if 
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“poetry is a part of the structure of reality[I]”, then “the structure of poetry and 
the structure of reality[F] are one”, which is the same as “poetry and reality[F] are 
one, or should be” (NA: 81).
Stevens is thus in agreement with Schelling that nature/realityF is a poem, the 
ultimate/central poem. There are, however, several differences. Schelling’s System 
points towards (or is about) the central poem, whereas Stevens’ poetry, his lesser 
poems, is (part) of the central poem. For we can have experiences with these par-
ticular poems, and can thus experience the central poem itself. We pose an, at least 
partial, criterion for determining the central poem. In this epistemic sense, in con-
trast to Schelling’s System, Stevens’ lyrical project is completed. However, the central 
poem itself is something inherently incomplete. It is an “endlessly elaborating poem”. 
RealityF is not a solid, as expressed in the final lines of “An Ordinary Evening”:
It is not in the premise that reality
Is a solid. It may be a shade that traverses
A dust, a force that traverses a shade. (CP: 489)
RealityF (or maybe realityT) is traversing, in motion. It may be a shade traversing 
a dust (possibly a product of the imagination) or a force behind this shade (pos-
sibly the imagination itself or an agent of the imagination).
If realityF is the product of the imagination known as the central poem, then 
this poem must reveal the identity of itself with the self, i.e. with the agent of the 
imagination. The agent must become aware that she is actually imagining the 
central poem. In Schelling’s System, this awareness is accomplished in the intel-
lectual intuition, in the apperception. This apperception, this becoming aware 
of the central poem, is anything but easy for Stevens; it is a “difficult appercep-
tion”. This brings us to our final topic, which we have already touched on several 
times: the agent that imagines the central poem.
Central mind – total realityT
We have established that nature (nature outside us as well as our inner nature), 
realityF, is a product of the imagination.20 Yet the imagination is a faculty or a 
power of the mind. Is there such an imagining agent; and if so, how can we 
characterize it? Throughout his works, Stevens examines several possibilities 
without ultimately endorsing any of them. In this section, I argue that the agent 
of the imagination is best thought of as realityT, that is, as Being. This is the basic 
 20 RealityF is an ordering of realityI which is not a product of the imagination. RealityI 
exists prior to the imagination. Stevens thus cannot be labelled an idealist.
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tenet of every idealism. This Being is, however, something negative, or is even 
(identical to) nothing or nothingness; it is Nietzsche’s dead God. Furthermore, 
realityT/Being has no name, or at least no unique name, which implies that there 
is no final unity of realityT. RealityT is an encounter, not objectivity.21
Before we dig into Stevens’ various characterizations of the imagining agent, let 
us briefly look at the hypothesis that there is no such agent. Butler, in her analysis of 
the poem “World as Meditation”, writes that “it is unclear whether the meditation, 
which we might expect to belong to some meditating agent, has come unmoored 
from that agency, making the world a kind of free-floating meditation […]. If the 
world is the agent of meditation, or the activity of meditation conceived without 
an agent, then it is this curious presencing that, having no inherent temporal con-
tinuity, reveals itself in inadvertent and transient ways.” (1991: 274) For the present 
discussion, the key point is the question of whether the meditating agent can be 
unmoored from the meditation, that is, from an activity of the imagination. Stevens 
comes close to answering this question in the negative when he writes “we cannot 
tell apart / The idea and the bearer-being of the idea.” (CP: 466) Stevens does not 
say that the idea and its bearer-being are inseparable, but rather that we cannot tell 
them apart. In order to arrive at this conclusion, it is worth focusing on Stevens’ 
attempts to name the agent, that is, to tell them apart from each other.
In the early poem “Negation”, Stevens writes that “The creator too is blind”, 
and furthermore is the “[i] ncapable master of all force” (CP:  97). This is not 
Hegel’s self-conscious Absolute Spirit, but rather the evil creator or the ignorant 
Demiurge of Gnosticism.22 Even if the negative picture of the creator is some-
what amended in the second stanza, it remains the case that the negativity is the 
inherent feature of the creator and not of our epistemic access to him. RealityT/
Being is inherently negative.
Another attempt to name realityT is the notion of a central mind, which recurs 
in several poems. In “Man and Bottle” (CP: 238–9), the central mind is a destruc-
tive force, destroying the romantic dream of the final unity (“Romantic tenements 
of rose and ice”). The notion of a central mind occurs again in “Chocorua to Its 
Neighbor” (CP: 298). Chocorua, one of Stevens’ mythological giants, meditates:
       My solitaria
Are the meditations of a central mind.
I hear the motions of the spirit and the sound
Of what is secret becomes, for me, a voice
That is my own voice speaking in my ear.
 21 In this paragraph, I follow valuable suggestions by Charles Altieri.
 22 Cf. Žižek (2016).
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Here we have a positive description of Chocorua’s conscious identity with the 
central mind, which is, in effect, the central mind’s being conscious of itself, its 
self-consciousness. This picture is, however, disrupted in the next stanza:
There lies the misery, the coldest coil
That grips the centre, the actual bite, that life
Itself is like a poverty in the space of life,
So that the flapping of wind around me here
Is something in tatters that I cannot hold.”
Chocorua is a mythological figure, “image, / But not the person […], thought, 
/ But not the thinker” (CP: 299). He becomes one of the names of the central 
mind: “The collective being knew / There were others like him”. This is, again, 
an attempt to unmoor the meditating agency from the meditation itself. In doing 
so, Chocorua, being identical with the central mind, loses its personhood and 
its mind-hood, its mentality. Chocorua is a mountain which only represents the 
central mind. Another central agency – the collective being – has to be postu-
lated in order to assimilate Chocorua into the order of Being, that is, into realityF. 
Mythological being, or Being as mythology, is principally divided Being.23 The 
central mind is beyond “human things”; its unique name is “more / Than human 
voice” – but “that cannot be” (CP: 300).
The notion of a central mind is, for the last time, taken up in “Final Soliloquy of 
the Interior Paramour” where Stevens says that the world imagined (i.e. the cen-
tral poem, realityF) is the ultimate good. Yet he also presents the main hypothesis 
of the poem: “We say that God and the imagination are one” (CP: 524). God or 
imagination are termed as “light” and “central mind”. The question is whether 
God is the (faculty of the) imagination or the imagining agency. Regarding this, 
Stevens proposes the following syllogism in his “Adagia”:
1. God and the imagination are one.
2. The thing imagined is the imaginer.
The second equals the thing imagined and the imaginer are one. Hence, I suppose, the 
imaginer is God. (OP: 202)
 23 “The voice of the central man does not issue from the undivided source of nature’s sun. 
It is the offspring of a meditative doubleness that reflects a discontinuity both within 
and without, a radical difference between the human and natural orders, a gap at the 
center, at the site of intended unification where the crisis of the divided self is supposed 
to be resolved.” (Ackerman 1987: 97)
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From the conclusion, it is evident that God is the agent of the imagination and 
not the faculty of the imagination only or the object of the imagination.24 God is 
also the central mind, as we read in the last stanza. It is clear, however, that the 
central mind is not our mind. We live out of this light or mind “in the evening 
air, / In which being there together is enough.” (CP: 524) The central mind is not 
our mind and we do not reach it. The poem is thus not about the paramour’s or 
our elevation to a godlike status through our imagination; it is, rather, about real-
izing, as Leggett writes, that the paramour’s mind “does not contain or imagine 
the world; he is contained within the world’s imagination, the imagination of a 
‘central mind.’ ” (2005: 176)25 The central mind is not something we have to search 
for or seek to reach. The central mind, realityT, is not the objective of the poet’s 
search; that is realityF, the world imagined, the ultimate good. Our minds are, at 
the same time, parts of the central mind, of total realityT. We just do not want to 
fully recognize and express this fact (CP: 288), nor do we have to do so. In other 
words, realizing the “difficult apperception” is no longer the ultimate purpose.
We have already discussed the image of the giant from “A Primitive Like an 
Orb”. This giant is one of the series of mythological figures that aim to capture 
the agency imagining reality. Every attempt to name such an agency in its unity 
has failed. Let us look at another attempt whose failure is very instructive. In “An 
Ordinary Evening”, Stevens writes:
A scholar, in his Segmenta, left a note,
As follows, “The Ruler of Reality,
If more unreal than New Haven, is not
A real ruler, but rules what is unreal.”
In addition, there were draftings of him, thus:
“He is the consort of the Queen of Fact. (CP: 485)
What is at stake here is the unity of realityT. The Ruler of Reality rules realityF, i.e. 
he rules what is unrealI. Who then rules what is realI? The Queen of Fact. Being/
RealityT is thus divided into the Ruler of Reality and the Queen of Fact, into the 
ruler of realityF and the ruler of realityI. The central mind consists of two minds – 
the Ruler and the Queen. We have arrived again at the line: “Real and unreal are 
two in one” (ibid.). What remains to be explained is their mystical marriage.
Let us come back to “The World as Meditation” (CP:  520–1). Penelope 
meditates: “The trees had been mended, as an essential exercise / In an inhuman 
 24 For this interpretation, see Leggett (2005: 172).
 25 I have omitted Leggett’s convincing argument that the interior paramour is the poet 
himself, not his muse as many commentators have maintained.
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meditation, larger than her own.” If there were any agency imagining the nat-
ural world outside her (the trees), it would be an inhuman agency. The essen-
tial exercise that is also mentioned in the opening quotation from George 
Enesco: “But the essential exercise of the composer – meditation – nothing has 
ever suspended that in me.” (Cook 2007: 289) The essential exercise is very close 
to Coleridge’s “eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM”. But Stevens maintains, 
contra Coleridge and his predecessors including Schelling, that the I  AM is 
inhuman, not my own.26
What comes out here – and this will be my final point – is that the imag-
ining agency/central mind/realityT/Being cannot be given any unique name. All 
the names we have already considered are mythological ones capturing a cer-
tain aspect of realityT; they are in fact hidden descriptions expressing its totality, 
eccentricity (ex-centricity), inhumanity, blindness, ignorance, incapability, etc. 
In the late poem “The Sail of Ulysses”, “the true creator”, who is “creating from 
nothingness”, is contrasted with the “unnamed creator of an unknown sphere, 
/ Unknown as yet, unknowable, / Uncertain certainty” (OP:  127). As soon as 
this unknown creator enters or is imagined by the self, it becomes “The great 
Omnium [that] descends on us” (OP:  128) or that “descends on me, / Like 
an absolute” (OP:  132). The great Omnium is another description of realityT, 
expressing its totality.
This idea of the impossibility of naming is expressed in the first stanza of “It 
Must Be Abstract” (CP: 381):
Never suppose an inventing mind as source
Of this idea nor for that mind compose
A voluminous master folded in his fire.
The ephebe, the addressee of the poem, should never postulate an agency imag-
ining the first idea. This is because all gods that could be conceived in the place 
of such an agency are dead. Phoebus–Apollo is dead. “But Phoebus was / A name 
for something that never could be named.” This is why we had to let Phoebus 
die. Phoebus has also never been a unique name of the sun/Being. The stanza 
concludes with the explicit claim: “The sun / Must bear no name”.
 26 Butler (1991: 274) tries to resist postulating any meditating agency here: “we might 
expect a divine agent to occupy the originating point of that meditation, but instead 
we find the activity reproducing itself, without an agent and without a teleological pur-
pose. […] Meditation is ‘inhuman’ in the sense that the natural world is exercised by 
that activity, but also because it is indifferent, even cruel, and without a final purpose.”
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Stevens tried to give Being many names that also turned out to be descriptions. 
Even “Being” is not the name of Being. What are these descriptions of? Stevens, 
following Kant or perhaps Fichte,27 addresses Being as a variable X. Here is the 
climax of “The Motive for Metaphor” (CP: 288):
The A B C of being,
The ruddy temper, the hammer
Of red and blue, the hard sound—
Steel against intimation—the sharp flash,
The vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X.
Here we have a series of descriptions of X, of an unknown variable “that would 
never be quite expressed”. It is a “difficult apperception”, a difficult unity of nature 
and the self. It is the unknown name of Being, a name that is not.
Schelling argues that the ground of identity between the absolute subject (the 
conscious) and the absolute object (the unconscious) “can be neither subject 
nor object nor both at once, but only the absolute identity” (1800: 209). Hence, 
the absolute agent of the imagination (engendering realityF and the self) cannot 
be conceived as a subject, but rather as mere Being. Schelling furthermore 
maintains that this ground of all beings is the “eternal unknown, which, like the 
everlasting sun in the realm of spirits, conceals itself behind its own unclouded 
light”. For this transcendental agency is wholly unknown, it “cannot, in fact, have 
any predicates whatever”. This absolute unknowability is, however, weakened by 
the fact that we can find traces of its identity “in the lawfulness which runs […] 
through the free play of choice in history” (ibid.). This is, again, a tension within 
Schelling’s System. Is the transcendental agency wholly unknowable or can it be 
known through its traces? Finally, as we already know, Schelling postulates this 
transcendental agency as a methodological stance, not as a metaphysical claim.
 27 Stevens probably did not intend to refer to Kant or Fichte or to any other philosopher in 
particular. The affinity is, however, striking. In Kant’s First Critique, the transcendental 
object = X is just a “something in general” (A109); it is the pure concept of an object 
in general, the concept of the transcendental object which is the concept of a thing in 
itself. (Cf. Hickey (2001: 119) for an argument that all these concepts are identical.) 
Yet Kant uses the form “= X” for the transcendental subject as well: “a transcendental 
subject of thoughts = X, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its 
predicates” (B404). Kant does not make fully explicit that these two Xs are identical, 
i.e. that the transcendental subject and the transcendental object are identical. Their 
identity is quite explicitly postulated in Fichte’s Science of Knowledge and, of course, 
in Schelling’s System. Cf. also Chris Genovesi’s discussion of the “dominant X” in this 
Kantian context on pp. 96 and 105f. in the present volume.
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We can take Stevens’ poetry as a kind of partial confirmation (and also an 
elucidation) of these ideas that make up the core of Schelling’s transcendental 
idealism. For Stevens, the ground of the identity of subject and object lies out-
side the individual self. Then, however, this agency can be reached by predicates 
(vital, arrogant, fatal, etc.) or mythological names (giant, Phoebus, Chocorua, 
etc.). These predicates express partial aspects. This agency (realityT) is, at the 
same time, unknown, because its detachment from its products (realityF), as a 
speculative or methodological stance, an “as if ”, introduces the duality which 
dooms to failure any attempt to capture in language this agency in its unity.
I conclude with the claim that to speak of mere Being itself (Being as Being, 
realityT) is more than human voice is capable of. Being has no name. This is also 
Derrida’s critique of Heidegger in a nutshell: “There will be no unique name, not 
even the name of Being.” (1968: 27)28,29
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